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Financial advisors seek to accurately measure individuals' risk preferences and provide sound personalized investment advice. Both advice
tasks are increasingly offered through automated online technologies. Little is known, however, about what drives individuals' acceptance of such
automated ﬁnancial advice and, from a consumer point of view, which ﬁrms may be best positioned to provide such advice.
We generate novel insights on these questions by conducting a real-world empirical study using an interactive automated online tool that
employs an innovative computer algorithm to build pension investment proﬁles, the “Pension Builder,” and a large, representative sample.
We focus on the role that two key ﬁrm characteristics have on consumer acceptance of pension investment advice generated by computer
algorithms running on automated interactive online tools: proﬁt orientation and role in the sales channel.
We ﬁnd that consumers' perceptions of trust and expertise of the ﬁrm providing the automated advice are important drivers of advice acceptance
(besides a strong impact of the satisfaction with the consumer–online tool interaction), and that these constructs themselves are clearly inﬂuenced
by the for-proﬁt vs. not-for-proﬁt orientation and the product provider vs. advisor only role in the sales channel of the ﬁrm providing the advice.
We discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for marketers and policy makers and provide suggestions for future research.
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l“Planning for retirement? Look no further than your tablet or
smartphone.” “The rise of the robo advisors,” “computer
algorithms that invest your money for you” “better than you
could by yourself” “to help steer [you] to ﬁnancial products
tailored to [your] particular savings goals and risk prefer-
ences,” “will provide ‘fully regulated’ retirement advice and
will mimic what a human adviser would do, including
conducting a risk proﬁle, suitability check, and personal
recommendation.”
(Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 2015; Financial Times (FT)
2015; Time 2017).
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insurer apps to government-sponsored websites—offer auto-
mated interactive financial advice on investments, insurance,
or retirement, and pension planning.1 Like many other
industries, the financial advice industry has welcomed the
arrival of low-cost digital marketing (Varadarajan and Yadav
2002; Wind and Mahajan 2001). This is expected to
empower consumers (Barrutia and Echebarria 2005) and
expand the tools available online—on websites and on
mobile and social media—to interact with financial advisors,
who can then use them to better, and automatically,
customize advice and financial products to consumers
(Arora et al. 2008). Consumers themselves are also interested
in using such tools, even for complex decisions like
retirement planning and investing. According to industry
reports, in Great-Britain alone, 30% of pension savers
already prefer to use online advice tools rather than speaking
to a human financial advisor, more than half (53%) would
use a free online retirement planning tool to become
informed about “what to do” with their savings (B&CE
2016), and a third would pay for it (Deloitte 2017).
Online computer algorithms in the financial advice industry
now flourish in developed economies. Take the Investment
Balance pension advisor launched by the financial services
provider Centraal Beheer-Achmea in the Netherlands; the
Cora, a “robo-advisor” “much faster than a human advisor,”
run by private insurer and pension provider Liverpool Victoria
in the UK (FT 2015); the Retirement Manager of Morningstar
Inc.; the Blue Zone healthy-life expectancy algorithm devel-
oped with the University of Minnesota School of Public Health;
or the ESPlanner of Boston University economist Laurence
Kotlikoff in the US (WSJ 2015). The many examples of
automated interactive online tools (often appearing in the press
as “robo-advisors”; see the epigraph) that do risk profiling and
generate automated personalized financial advice reveal that
not only private but also state-sponsored organizations, both
profit and non-profit oriented, build and run such marketing
tools.
In theory, upon receiving the same input information from
consumers, personalized recommendations generated by auto-
mated online tools of different organizations can be the same
and thus should be equally accepted by consumers (Jung et al.
2018).2 However, the financial advice industry is a context
where assessing the quality of advice is challenging, even for
professionals (Merton 2006). Therefore, the extent to which
consumers accept what is said is likely to depend not only on1 The mix of quotes in epigraph appeared in recent articles in the popular and
ﬁnancial press praising such tools.
2 Ideally, regardless of who the advisor is, consumers should recognize the
superior value of unbiased personalized (pension) investment advice matching
their preferences, and accept it. Notice that advice discounting is rational if
(consumers believe) the advice is biased towards the interest of the advisor,
even if there is no principal-agent problem. The focus of our study is not on
advice discounting per se, but instead on differences in advice acceptance
across types of advisors. We also address the case where advisors facilitate
decisions, but consumers are the ones who generate their own advice (this is
further explained below).how it is said but also on who says so. In other words, a
financial advice (e.g., a conservative risk profile) automatically
generated by the same app(lication) or algorithm, and
communicated in the same way and using the same commu-
nication channel (e.g., an online website), may lead to different
acceptance–rejection rates simply because it comes from a
different type of advisor firm.
In this paper, we test this conjecture and investigate (a)
which advisor firms are best suited to provide automated
pension advice, i.e., whose advice is most accepted, and (b)
what are the underlying drivers of the different acceptance rates
between these firms. Answers to these questions will provide
theoretical insights into how consumers evaluate the automated
interactive online advice of advisor firms and how these
evaluations affect their advice acceptance, which is crucial for
marketers in general and public policy makers in particular who
wish to nudge individuals into making choices closer to what is
normatively better for them. In addition, they are relevant for
providers of investment plans who are increasingly under
pressure to move beyond uniform portfolios and allow
personalization of investment advice that more accurately
matches individuals' preferences for risk–return trade-offs
(e.g., Alserda et al. 2019; Bodie and Treussard 2007;
Sundaresan and Zapatero 1997). From an academic point of
view, answering these questions will enhance our understand-
ing of acceptance of automated digital advice and its link with
the type of advisor firm.
Because differences in acceptance rates across types of
digital advisors—who generate the same advice—are hard to
account for within a classical economics framework, we take a
behavioral economics approach informed by insights from
psychology research on irrational discounting of unbiased
advice—in particular, “egocentric advice discounting.” This is
an individual's tendency to overweight one's own opinion
relative to that of an advisor when deciding whether to accept
an advice (Harvey and Fischer 1997; Yaniv and Kleinberger
2000; for a review see Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). In addition,
even though individuals seek automated advice to aid important
high-stakes decisions in several contexts, including medical
ones (e.g., Esmaeilzadeh et al. 2015; Inthorn, Tabacchi, and
Seising 2015;), they suffer from “algorithm aversion.” This is a
tendency to irrationally, and systematically, discount advice
that is generated automatically and communicated by computer
algorithms (e.g., Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey 2015;
Goodwin, Gönül, and Önkal 2013).
This general tendency to discount advice might be
strengthened (or weakened) by the perceptions consumers
form about the advisor, which color their overall assessment of
advice quality and fit. Crucially, (i) how trustworthy (e.g.,
Sniezek and Van Swol 2001; cf. Prahl and Van Swol 2017) and
(ii) how much of an expert an advisor firm is perceived to be
(e.g., Sniezek, Schrah, and Dalal 2004; cf. Prahl and Van Swol
2017), are two of the most important characteristics that
consumers assess when having to accept or reject an advice.
Accordingly, we predict that perceptions of trust and expertise
are part of the underlying mechanisms, i.e., the mediators, by
which advisor types affect the likelihood of consumers
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online interactive tools.
Given the pivotal role of how satisfied consumers feel
interacting with the interface of the online tool (which
includes the way in which risk preferences of consumers are
elicited online in the advice giving process and how the advice
is presented online to consumers), we expect that the indirect
mediating effect of perceptions of trust and expertise on
advice acceptance may partially be a sequential one—through
satisfaction. A sequential or serial mediation is important from
a conceptual point of view—satisfaction with interactive
decision aids is a byproduct of perceptions—and it is
necessary empirically to ensure our study has discriminant
validity.
Finally, in our more general conceptualization of acceptance
of online automated financial advice we consider not only firm
characteristics, i.e., the type of organization providing the
online advice, and, as already mentioned, how the consumer
perceives this organization, but also consumer heterogeneity
(e.g., demographics) that may further determine acceptance of
online advice.
In the next section, we set the conceptual background by
summarizing the main findings on (online) advice acceptance
research in each of these domains. We then focus specifically
on the roles that firm type and firm characteristics play. Next,
we describe the setup and results from our large-scale empirical
study in the context of online financial pension advice that uses
a representative sample of the Dutch population and is designed
to address the role of firm type and firm characteristics on
advice acceptance. Our experimental design also allows us to
study the differences in acceptance of a firm's explicit vs.
implicit advice. A firm's implicit advice, in which the consumer
learns what her best-fitting investment profile is, without being
mentioned that that is a recommendation of the firm, can be
seen as similar to a “no advice” control group. Thus, in an
implicitly provided advice, the firm, without ever explicitly
saying how the consumer should invest, is essentially
facilitating the use of the computer algorithm running on the
automated online interactive tool on which the consumer
herself generates the advice. This is a condition of our study
design that enables us to identify the baseline effect of
automated advice—held constant across the four firm types.3
Interestingly, implicit advice (versus explicit advice) signifi-
cantly moderates the effect of the perceptions consumers hold
about a financial firm's expertise and trust on the acceptance of
that advice. Extending the main scope of our study, we offer an
interpretation of this effect based on the competence-warmth
dimensions of social cognition (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner
2010; Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007) that fits well with our
proposed expertise-trust conceptualization. We conclude the
paper with a discussion of all our findings, namely the
implications for the financial advice industry in general and
pension advisors in particular, and suggestions for future
research.3 We thank the Editor for making this suggestion.Drivers of Online Financial Advice Acceptance
Most research pertaining to online advice has focused on
the development of new methods to improve the quality of
the interaction design or has analyzed how consumers make
choices contingent on the form of the advice, e.g., online
recommendations (Ricci and Werthner 2006; Senecal and
Nantel 2004). This literature has mainly investigated online
decision aids that support decision makers, namely con-
sumers, who deal with complex decisions (e.g., Benbasat and
Wang 2005; Qiu and Benbasat 2009; see Xiao and Benbasat
2007 for a recent review). These software tools or interactive
decision aids aim to improve consumer decision quality while
simultaneously reducing the effort required to make a
decision (Häubl and Trifts 2000). Research has shown that
these tools can be very effective when consumers decide to
use them and when “the tools can learn” about individual
preferences (Diehl, Kornish, and Lynch 2003; Häubl and
Trifts 2000; Senecal and Nantel 2004; Urban and Hauser
2004).
In this paper, we focus on a broader, more complete value
chain analysis of the online advice process. As mentioned, we
do so by looking beyond—and keeping constant the effect of
—the interactive decision aid (the finance-based algorithm
running on an automated online interface) and by zooming in
on the differences in advice acceptance accruing from the
different types of firms that typically communicate financial
advice (“whose algorithm says so”), and whether those
differences change depending on whether the firm explicitly
communicates the advice to the consumer or it is the
consumer who arrives at, and thus gives herself, the same
advice that the firm would have communicated (the firm is in
this case “merely” facilitating the generation of automated
advice on its website). And in so doing, we consider
characteristics of the firm, characteristics of the consumer,
and characteristics of the interactions between the consumer
and the firm.Firm Characteristics: The Role of Firm Type
Individuals turn to firms for advice because, in principle,
firms have superior knowledge on available products, their
characteristics, and their fit to individual preferences. This
information asymmetry about product characteristics and
consumer needs, however, may hurt the relationship between
advisor firms and consumers or advisees (Van Swol 2009). For
instance, when an advisor is also the manager of an advisee's
product portfolio, such as an investment plan provider advising
a consumer investor, there may be a principal–agent problem,
i.e., the incentives and preferences of the advisor (the “agent”)
may not be perfectly aligned with those of the advisee (the
“principal”). Hence, to maximize the chances that an individual
receives the best product advice, firms need to be willing, and
have the ability, to elicit individual risk preferences properly,
which is not a trivial exercise (see Donkers, Lourenço, and
Dellaert 2012).
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promotional or persuasive advertising, in the sense that advice
is not necessarily considered manipulative or invasive but
rather a means to improve participants' decisions (Yaniv 2004).
Moreover, because an advice is prescriptive in nature it is more
easily associated with an independent third party (Schrah,
Dalal, and Sniezek 2006). In addition, when consumers look
after, and then follow, an advice, those decisions inevitably
imply a shared responsibility for whatever outcome the advice
leads to (Harvey and Fischer 1997).
Jointly, these considerations suggest that consumer
perception of the advisor's expertise, as well as the extent to
which consumers trust that the advisor has provided an
unbiased advice, are key drivers of the willingness to accept
the advice (Shapiro 1987; Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000; Van
Swol and Sniezek 2005; White 2005). We anticipate that a
firm's perceived expertise and trust are a function of what
type of firm the firm is. In particular, whether the firm is (i-a)
for-profit or (i-b) not-for-profit, and whether it is (ii-a) a
pension provider or (ii-b) an advisor-only (see Fig. 1). More
formally, we expect the perceived expertise and trustworthi-
ness of a firm to be mediators of the effects of firm types on
acceptance of online advice, as summarized graphically in
Fig. 2.
Despite facing common regulations (see Baker and Dellaert
2018) for an extensive discussion about regulation of
automated (robo-) advice in the financial services industry),
whether an online automated advisor is a for-profit or not-for-
profit firm signals consumers different incentives to provide
advice, and the extent to which these incentives are aligned (or
unaligned) with the incentives of consumers. Recently, it has
been shown that consumers stereotypically perceive profit-
seeking firms in conflict with social good (Bhattacharjee, Dana,
and Baron 2017). Thus, all else being equal, we propose that
online automated advisors of not-for-profit firms are likely to
enjoy higher levels of trust than those of for-profit firms,
especially in light of the poor general perception of the financial
industry, which becomes particularly acute in and after
financial and economic crises (Mayer 2013).
Likewise, we propose that online automated advisors of
firms that do not sell their own investment products are likely toWhose automated financial advice: For- vs. not-for-profit orientation and product 
provider vs. advisor-only role in the sales channel and the four types of advisor firms 
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Fig. 1. Whose automated financial advice: For- vs. not-for-profit orientation and
product provider vs. advisor-only role in the sales channel and the four types of
advisor firms.be seen as trustworthier than those of firms selling their own
investment products. Especially in the short run, sellers may
enjoy high rewards from products with high profit margins,
which may create perverse incentives to provide biased advice
(e.g., Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2010; Inderst and
Ottaviani 2012).
On the other hand, the online automated advisors of both
for-profit firms and firms selling their own investment plans
are likely to be seen as the result of higher levels of expertise
than those of not-for-profit firms and firms selling investment
plans of others. Expertise is a competitive weapon that for-
profit firms need to survive in highly sophisticated, tightly
regulated, competitive markets such as those for investment
plans (see e.g., Coates and Glenn Hubbard 2007). Not-for-
profit firms simply do not face these challenging market rules
and thus expertise is less of an issue. In turn, firms selling their
own investment products are almost by definition the ones that
know best (and better than anyone else) their own product
line.
Consumer Characteristics and the Consumer–Online Tool
Interaction Satisfaction
Several individual characteristics may further help explain
heterogeneity in automated advice acceptance. In particular, an
individual's gender and income can be expected to affect advice
taking, especially in the context of financial decisions
(Bhattacharya et al. 2012). Women have been found to be
less certain than men about their ability to handle financial
matters (cf. Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar 1994; Prince
1993), and may therefore be more inclined to accept advice
than men. Low-income individuals are also expected to accept
advice more readily than wealthier individuals. In a financial
decision context, lower income individuals are more vulnerable
if they make the “wrong” choice and therefore should discount
the advice less (i.e., they should value the advice more) than
individuals with higher income.
Age too may affect individuals' interest in financial
decisions and hence their willingness to consider and accept
financial advice. As people age and face the prospect of
reduced ability to remain active in the work force, they are
likely to become more interested in financial advice and what
future income they can expect in the absence of labor income.
Finally, education may also influence advice acceptance, but
the direction of the effect may be less clear. On the one hand,
someone with a higher education may be able to more easily
process financial information and advice, i.e., be financially
more literate (see e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011; Lusardi,
Mitchell and Curto 2010), which may lead to higher advice
transparency and thus acceptance. On the other hand,
someone with a lower education level may more easily
recognize the need for advice and thus accept it (Lee and
Moray 1992).
The acceptance of online financial advice may also depend
on aspects of the interaction with the automated algorithm on
which the advice is based (Briggs, De Angeli, and Lynch
2002; Dabholkar and Bagozzi 2002; Dellaert and Dabholkar
Fig. 2. Conceptual and empirical models of acceptance of automated pension investment advice. The automated financial advice acceptance and other constructs of
interest and their relationships according to our conceptualization are presented alongside the control variables in the empirical structural equation model. The four
types of advisor firms are hypothesized to have a direct effect on automated financial advice acceptance (the two long arrows in the middle), as well as an indirect one
through the mediators, expertise of and trust in the advisor firm, and the consumer–online tool interaction satisfaction (itself affected by perceptions of expertise and
trust). Consumer expertise as well as consumer demographics are controlled for in the four outcome variables, as depicted.
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our empirical study, we use a single-item measure, that of
“overall satisfaction with the online tool.” Not surprisingly,
the literature on interaction satisfaction is vast (see e.g., Davis
1989; Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw 1989; Rogers 2003; Van
der Heijden 2003) and suggests there are numerous factors at
play when it comes to consumer interactions with online
automated marketing tools.
Subjective appreciations about different types of firms and
what they do—including their use of online automated
interactive systems—may color how users perceive the
interactions with automated tools. Trust and expertise, in
particular, are likely to influence users' perceptions and
subsequent acceptance of such tools (Tseng and Fogg 1999;
Waern and Ramberg 1996). Also, marketing studies show that
trust is correlated with future interaction intentions (Doney and
Cannon 1997; Ramsey and Sohi 1997). And research in
human–computer interaction suggests that technology accep-
tance is influenced by the ability of that technology to deliver
correct advice (Tseng and Fogg 1999). Moreover, consumers'
interaction satisfaction is positively associated with perceived
effort of automated online decision aids (Bechwati and Xia
2003). How much users see themselves as experts also affects
the satisfaction with interactive recommendation agents (Su,
Comer, and Lee 2008).4 In a nutshell, consumers evaluate how much they need to contribute for the
advice to be generated and how valuable the advice is that they receive in return.
This includes (a) the actions that consumers need to take independently, such as
collecting information on ﬁnancial products, as well as (b) the joint steps that
they need to take in interaction with the ﬁrm and the ﬁrm's computerized tools,
such as making risky choices and revealing their risk preferences online, and (c)
assessing the quality of the advice provided by the ﬁrm.In sum, in our framework satisfaction with the online tool is
impacted by perceptions of expertise and trust, which are
themselves influenced by firm type (for-profit vs. not-for-profit
and product provider vs. advisor only). In other words, we
propose there is a sequential or serial mediation effect of firm
type on advice acceptance: (i) from firm type to satisfaction
through perceptions of expertise and trust, and (ii) from
perceptions of expertise and trust to advice acceptance through
satisfaction. This comprehensive conceptualization, that gives
consumer–online tool interaction satisfaction a pivotal role in
the acceptance of online automated advice, allows us to also
assess the discriminant validity of satisfaction vis-á-vis advice
acceptance.
Empirical Study with an Automated Advisor for Retire-
ment Investment
To investigate the mediating role of consumer perceptions of
firm expertise and trust (and the one through satisfaction with
the consumer–online tool interaction) and how these percep-
tions depend on the type of firm providing online automated
financial advice, we collect data from a large representative
sample of the population in the Netherlands. We use our own
automated algorithm “brought to life” as an online, highly
interactive tool that helps users build their own risk preferences
on a simple drag-and-drop and point-and-click interface, and
employ it in a pension and retirement context.
Pensions involve high-stakes decisions and are largely the
result of, among other factors, personal savings or home
ownership, life expectancy, and health (Fornero, Rossi, and
Brancati 2014; Nyce et al. 2013), and advice is crucial to guide
individuals into their preferred retirement trajectories (see e.g.,
Van Schie, Dellaert, and Donkers 2015). Moreover, financial
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face of recent socioeconomic changes such as increasing
retirement age (Vogel, Ludwig, and Börsch-Supan 2015;
Vuuren 2014).
The data were collected online with The Pension Builder, an
automated pension tool we developed in collaboration with two
large Dutch pension providers (through the research center
Netspar—Network for Studies on Pensions, Aging and
Retirement). Its main interactive, automated features are
explained next.
“The Pension Builder” Online Automated Tool for Retirement
Advice
The Pension Builder automated tool is built on recent
advances in interactive online pension risk preference elicita-
tion and advice. In particular, the Pension Builder builds on the
Distribution Builder introduced by Goldstein, Johnson, and
Sharpe (2008) that can be used to elicit risk preferences. We
implemented a prototype of the Pension Builder as recently
proposed by Dellaert et al. (2016), which is adapted to the
Dutch consumer pension decision-making context (see also
Donkers et al. 2013). Fig. 3 shows the Pension Builder interface
respondents used in the study.
The Pension Builder provides consumers with an intuitive
device to express their preferences over risky investment
outcomes and to make joint decisions on the risks and returns of
financial outcomes. Importantly, the automated online tool
draws on previous research on risk representations,Fig. 3. The Pension Builder interactive decision tool. Users of the Pension Builder ha
at Retirement slider (from 64 to 70 years old in steps of 1 month; “leeftijd pension
Dutch). The horizontal “x-axis” of the graphical interface expresses income at retirem
of 5 percentage points (p.p.)). Users of the interactive decision tool can move the slid
100 green markers that represent the distribution of their income at retirement. In th
violet background color, in this case spanning from 0% to 20% of (gross) income at r
Note that the shape and location of the distribution are aligned with the user-situatiodemonstrating that individuals are best capable of understand-
ing probabilities when these are presented graphically as
frequencies of occurrence of a risky event (Fagerlin,
Zikmund-Fisher, and Ubel 2011). Using the interactive
automated interface, users can learn how decisions on
investment risk and retirement age affect the distribution of
their monthly net retirement income. Shifting towards higher
retirement ages or more risky investment profiles will result in
higher expected retirement income, visualized by the distribu-
tion of markers moving to the right, i.e., to higher income
levels. At the same time, more risk will also result in a more
dispersed (i.e., risky) distribution. One specific benefit of this
type of automated interface is the embedded interactivity that
aids consumers, and the firms they deal with, discovering their
preferences.
To capture important aspects of the retirement savings and
retirement timing decisions of consumers, the new interactive
graphical Pension Builder that we built expands previous,
more generic algorithms, in a number of ways. Two important
innovations in particular are worth mentioning: (1) respon-
dents are presented with a projected monthly retirement
income including their base state-pension, which is the basis
they should use when thinking of risk–return trade-offs; and
(2) respondents are allowed to shift their desired retirement
date. The desired retirement date is a fundamental driver of
pension wealth and pension wealth needs. For example,
retirement one year later calls for higher contributions to
pension wealth while withdrawals from pension wealth are
postponed. The new automated online tool was pretested andve two sliders at their disposal to reveal their preferences for retirement: an Age
ering” in Dutch) and a Risk slider (from “Low” to “High”; “risicobereiheid” in
ent as the percentage of the last earned gross income (from 0% to 125% in steps
ers to learn about the consequences of various choices, as these sliders move the
e process, users also experience a number of draws from the distribution. The
etirement, indicates the part of retirement income provided by the state pension.
n, based on their age and income.
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partner organizations as well as novice users. This resulted
in further refinements of the wording and the graphical
interface of the automated tool and the underlying computer
algorithms.Experimental Design
Structure of the Survey Task
The structure of the study was explained to respondents after
they agreed to participate. They were first shown a short video
explaining the basic features and workings of the Pension
Builder automated tool. They then answered several short
questions to make sure that they understood how it worked and
were requested to watch the video again if the questions were
answered incorrectly. We note that once these questions are
answered correctly, it is unlikely that participants form different
perceptions regarding the different firms' ability to actually
implement such artificial intelligence tool, which is what the
online automated tool is in the end, and the reputation for it.
Next, respondents were asked their age and income level,
which that were used to generate the distribution of their net
retirement income; hence, the automated algorithm showed a
unique income distribution for that respondent's situation.
Finally, respondents were asked to use the sliders for retirement
age and risk–return trade-off to “build” their preferences in the
Pension Builder.
Participants were randomly assigned to either a firm's
explicit advice condition (ExpAdvice) or a firm's implicit
advice condition (ImpAdvice). The participants' investment
preferences elicited through the Pension Builder online
interface on a firm's website were used in both conditions
to generate a personalized best-fitting investment profile
(“defensive,” “neutral,” or “offensive”). In the explicit
advice condition, participants were told that the firm, based
on their choices, recommends that they invest according to
their best-fitting investment profile. In the implicit advice
condition, participants were told, based on their choices,
what their best-fitting investment profile was, without
mentioning explicitly that that is a recommendation of the
firm. The implicit advice condition can be seen as a control
condition, in the sense that there is no explicit firm-provided
financial advice, thus allowing us to test the baseline effect
of the automated firm-advice—held constant across the four
firm types. Moreover, we can determine the effect of
potential interactions between explicit versus implicit advice
and the perceptions of expertise and perceptions of trust on
advice acceptance.
In the Appendix, we present the survey instructions used to
frame the explicit vs. implicit advice before the investment
profile was generated online. For instance, while the explicit
advice condition instructions mention, at some point, that the
firm “has created a new retirement simulator and you will have
to indicate when you want to retire and how much risk youwant to take with your pension investments” and that the firm
“will give you appropriate advice about your pension
investments based on your preferences,” the implicit advice
condition instructions mention that the firm “has created a new
retirement simulator that you can use to help yourself make
your choice” [and] “choose when you want to retire and how
much risk you want to take with your pension investments,” and
then “try out various options and decide for yourself which one
suits you best.”
In all conditions, participants were asked to indicate the
likelihood that they would accept the advised best-fitting
investment profile provided to them. At the end of the study,
participants also answered several questions regarding their
personal characteristics and their evaluation of the firm (one of
the four possible ones) responsible for the automated advisor
algorithm and interface providing the advice.Experimental Manipulation of Firm Characteristics
To test the impact of firm characteristics on consumer advice
acceptance and the mediating role of perceived firm expertise
and level of trust in the firm, we randomly assigned
respondents to one of the four different types of firms (crossed
with the explicit and implicit advice conditions explained above
(eight conditions in total)). These firm types were selected on
the basis of a review of different types of organizations that
currently provide online pension advice in the Dutch pension
market, which lends external validity to our study. Moreover,
the types of firms selected ensure variation in participants'
perceived level of firm expertise and trustworthiness. Specif-
ically, we classified pension advisors based on the following:
their profit orientation as either “for profit” or “not-for-profit”
organizations and their role in the sales channel as either a
“product provider” selling its own pension products or an
“advisor-only.”
We selected a representative firm type for each of the four
combinations, resulting in the following four types of firms
(see Fig. 1): (1) For profit & product provider: Insurance
firm, (2) For profit & advisor-only: Privately-owned com-
parison website, (3) Not-for-profit & product provider:
Pension fund, and (4) Not-for-profit & advisor-only: Gov-
ernment-sponsored comparison website. When introducing
the Pension Builder task to respondents, we framed the
Pension Builder service as if it were provided by one of these
four firms. Importantly, the for-profit vs. not-for-profit and
product provider vs. advisor only distinctions were not made
explicit, only the four firm types were. Yet, to make sure
these distinctions are something ordinary consumers are
attuned to, not our own attributions, we conducted a separate
online study among a representative sample of 201 Dutch
participants.
The results confirmed that, as expected, the for-profit firms
(insurers and commercial comparison websites) jointly are
perceived higher in profit orientation than the not-for-profits
(pension funds and information websites of the government)
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pension funds) are perceived to provide more of their own
products than advisors only (commercial comparison websites
and information websites of the government) (t = −4.51,
p b .001).56 The interaction satisfaction average scores of not-for-proﬁt advisors areMeasurement of Perceptions, Dependent Variable, and Re-
spondent Characteristics
To measure consumer perceptions of firm expertise and
level of trust in the firm, we adapted items from existing
validated scales to our context. More specifically, we
measured expertise using six items for which respondents
indicated their agreement on a 7-point scale (1 = totally
disagree to 7 = totally agree) with regard to a firm of type X
(i.e., one of the four firm types as shown to the respondent).
The items were defined as follows (translated from Dutch): (a)
“A firm of type X has much experience in the pension
domain,” (b) “A firm of type X is skilled in the pension
domain,” (c) “A firm of type X has a lot of expertise in the
pension domain,” (d) “A firm of type X has a good
understanding of the pension product market,” (e) “A firm of
type X has a lot of knowledge about many different products in
the pension market,” and (f) “A firm of type X is capable of
finding the best product for me.” For trust, we employed a 3-
item measurement scale. Respondents were again asked to
answer on the same 7-point scale (1 = totally disagree to 7 =
totally agree). The items were: (a) “When it comes to
providing information about pensions and pension products,
I trust a firm of type X,” (b) “When it comes to providing
information about pensions and pension products, a firm of
type X is honest,” (c) “When it comes to providing information
about pensions and pension products, I believe what a firm of
type X tells me.”
As a measure of consumer acceptance of online advice, we
asked respondents to indicate how likely it was that they
would follow the online advice provided to them on a 0%–
100% probability scale (Elrod, Louviere, and Davey 1992).
This is our main dependent variable. We also asked
respondents to evaluate the online interaction. In this study
we use their overall satisfaction with the Pension Builder
interface as a summary measure of their interaction evaluation
(see our theoretical background and conceptualization above).5 On average, participants were 44.1 years old (SD = 12.5 years old), 51.7%
were females, 32.4% had a tertiary education degree (i.e., a bachelor degree or
higher), 66.6% had a secondary education degree, and 1% had primary
education. Participants were asked to consider websites that provide advice
about ﬁnancial products, in particular about possible investments for their
pension. They were presented with four different organizations that could offer
such an advice website: their insurer, their pension fund, a commercial
comparison website, and an information website of the government.
Afterwards, participants were asked the following two questions: “please
indicate where you think each organization stands with regard to [being focused
on making a proﬁt / how many ﬁnancial products of their own they offer].” Both
perceptions were measured on a Likert scale from 1 (= ‘not at all focused on
making a proﬁt’/ ‘offers many of their own products’) to 7 (= ‘fully focused on
making a proﬁt’/ ‘offers no products of their own at all’).This was measured on a 7-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied to
7 = very satisfied).6 Finally, we asked respondents to report
several personal characteristics, including age, gender, in-
come, education, and user expertise (using the same 7-point
scale (1 = totally disagree to 7 = totally agree) and the
following items: “I have a lot of experience in the field of
pensions,” “I am proficient at pensions,” “I have a lot of
expertise in the field of pensions,” “I have a good overview of
the market for pension products,” “I have knowledge about
many different products in the market,” “I am able to find the
best product for me”).Data and Analysis
SSI, a professional panel data firm using large consumer
panels in the Netherlands that ensure a representative
sample of the Dutch population, collected the data for our
study. Respondents were invited to participate in the survey
if they belonged to the working population and worked at
least 12 hours per week. Out of 6,473 respondents who
started the study, we only analyze responses of 1,649
respondents who watched the explanatory video and for
whom we obtained valid data.7 In our sample, 38.1% are
women, the average age was 45.2 years old (with a range
from 21 to 65 and a standard deviation of 11.3 years old),
and 17.5% had a bachelor degree or higher. The average
gross yearly income is 41,947 euros per year (with a range
from 15,500 to 280,000 euros and a standard deviation of
24,991 euros).
To check for scale validity, we conducted a confirmatory
factor analysis on the firm expertise and trust scales. The
results reflect two different factors for the firms' perceived
level of expertise and trust (since one item of the expertise
scale also partially loaded on the trust scale, this item was
eliminated from further analysis). The resulting Cronbach's
alphas were 0.97 for both scales. Jointly, these results support
the validity of the scale measures. The main descriptive
statistics of all variables and their correlations are presented in
Table 1. The average acceptance rate is 58.5% with a standard
deviation of 23.5%.larger than those of for-proﬁt advisors, but the difference is only marginally
signiﬁcant (Mnot-for-proﬁt = 4.734, SD = 1.557; Mfor-proﬁt = 4.604, SD = 1.542;
t(1,649,2) = 1.705, p = .10). There is no statistically signiﬁcant difference
between pension product providers vs. advisors-only (p N .10). The interaction
satisfaction average scores across the four advisor types are the following (in
decreasing order): Pension fund = 4.78, Government-based sponsored compar-
ison website = 4.67, Privately-owned comparison website = 4.61, and Insur-
ance ﬁrm = 4.60.
7 This low continuation rate may be due to several factors, such as internet
connection difﬁculties, lack of time to watch the full video and participate, and
lack of ﬁt with the respondent's interests, although we have no data to support
any of these possibilities. We note that in our study lack of ﬁt cannot be
attributed to self-selection—if, to start with, some consumers were more
inclined to seek online pension advice than others—because who gives the
advice is exogenously determined in the experimental design. Quantifying the
impact of self-selection on advice acceptance in ‘the real’ is an important
research question, however, and one we see worth pursuing in the future.
Table 1
Main descriptive statistics (top panel) and correlation matrix (bottom panel).
Advice Acceptance Expertise Trust Satisfaction Age Income User expertise
Mean 58.51 4.64 4.24 4.67 45.21 41,947.21 3.42
S.D. 23.48 1.32 1.49 1.55 11.35 24,991.32 1.51
Max. 100 7 7 7 65 280,000 7
Min. 0 1 1 1 21 15,500 1
N 1,522 1,649 1,649 1,649 1,649 1,633 1,649
Advice
Acceptance
Expertise Trust For profit Product
provider
Satisfaction Age High
education
Gender Income
Expertise 0.577
Trust 0.600 0.764
For profit −0.072 −0.100 −0.252
Product
provider
0.046 0.211 0.031 −0.005
Satisfaction 0.757 0.588 0.633 −0.051 0.016
Age −0.057 0.027 −0.080 −0.024 0.015 −0.074
High education 0.018 −0.014 −0.044 −0.005 0.026 −0.034 −0.091
Gender −0.088 −0.075 −0.064 0.019 −0.029 −0.088 −0.114 0.018
Income 0.026 0.043 0.011 0.001 −0.027 0.036 0.094 0.230 −0.222
User expertise 0.236 0.258 0.337 −0.055 0.009 0.292 −0.098 0.043 −0.190 0.150
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Kenny's (1986) assume independent causal steps to investigate
the conceptualized relationships, we used an econometric
structural equation model (SEM) that estimates these effects
simultaneously (Iacobucci 2008; Zhao, Lynch Jr, and Chen
2010). Instead of separately estimating (i) the effect of firm type
on expertise and trust, (ii) the effect of firm type on advice
acceptance and satisfaction, and the combined effects of (iii-a)
firm type and expertise and trust on satisfaction and of (iii-b)
firm type, expertise and trust, and satisfaction on advice
acceptance, a SEM model estimates the various relationships
while handling estimation uncertainty jointly and efficiently.
Fig. 2 provides a schematic representation of the empirical
model. The presence of mediation effects can be assessed by
evaluating the significance of the estimates of the direct effects
on the different paths (all estimated at once, as just mentioned):
if (a) firm type has (does not have) a significant direct effect on
advice acceptance and (b) firm type has a significant effect on
say perceptions of expertise, and perceptions of expertise have
a significant effect on advice acceptance, then firm type has a
partially (fully) mediated effect on advice acceptance. We
estimated our model in Stata. The results, much in line with
what we anticipated in our conceptualization, are reported in
Table 2.88 We estimated the model using the gsem [Generalized Structural Equation
Model] command, which makes use of more observations whenever possible,
as is the case in the Expertise, Trust, User expertise, and Satisfaction with the
online interaction equations. The model's Log likelihood is −16,448.7. Model
ﬁt comparisons of models estimated with the gsem command, however, are not
straightforward due to the use of a different and typically larger number of
observations. Estimating the model with Stata's sem command instead, leads to
a standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR) equal to 0.058 and below
0.08, an indication the model ﬁts the data well (see Kline 2011). The coefﬁcient
of determination (CD), an R2 equivalent measure, is 0.269.Results
The Impact of Firm Type on Perceived Expertise and Trust, and
on Satisfaction
First, we determine whether the two criteria (for profit vs.
not-for-profit and product provider vs. advisor-only) we use to
classify the types of firms, affect respondents' perceptions of
expertise and trust. In respect to perceptions of trust, as
expected, our results show that for-profit firms are trusted
significantly less than, respectively, not-for-profit ones (β =
−0.491; p b .001). Firms that provide their own products are
also trusted less than advisor-only firms (β = −0.378;
p b .001). As predicted, we find that consumers perceive
firms that provide their own pension products as having
significantly higher expertise than advisor-only firms (β =
0.566; p b .001). We also find that for-profit firms are
perceived to have significantly lower expertise than not-for-
profit firms (β = −0.224; p b .001).
In turn, we find that perceptions of expertise and perceptions
of trust both have a significant positive effect on interaction
satisfaction (β = 0.296; p b .001 and β = 0.449; p b .001 for
expertise and trust, respectively), as expected. We also find that
consumers are significantly less satisfied interacting with the
automated decision tool of firms that provide their own pension
products than of advisor-only firms (β = −0.183; p b .01).
Consumers are significantly more satisfied interacting with the
automated decision tool of for-profit firms than that of not-for-
profits (β = 0.270; p b .001).
Clearly, then, a for-profit orientation can be seen as a
double “perceptual” jeopardy for online automated advisors
because it negatively impacts consumer perceptions of both
expertise and trustworthiness, which then carry over to
interaction satisfaction. To make things worse for for-profits,
which receive poorer perceptions of expertise than not-for-
Table 2
Structural effects of type of advisor firm, expertise and trust on likelihood of acceptance of automated pension investment advice §.
Acceptance of automated
online pension advice
Perceived expertise of
online advisor firm
Perceived trust of online
advisor firm
Satisfaction with
interactive decision aid
Perceived user expertise
95% L 95%U 95% L 95% U 95% L 95% U 95% L 95% U 95% L 95% U
For profit advisor b 0.112 −1.457 1.681 −0.224 −0.344 −0.104 −0.491 −0.576 −0.406 0.270 0.152 0.387
se 0.800 0.061 0.043 0.060
z 0.140 −3.660 −11.310 4.500
p 0.889 0.000 0.000 0.000
Product provider
advisor
b 0.148 −1.416 1.713 0.566 0.446 0.686 −0.378 −0.465 −0.291 −0.183 −0.301 −0.065
se 0.798 0.061 0.044 0.060
z 0.190 9.240 −8.510 −3.040
p 0.853 0.000 0.000 0.002
Perceived expertise
of advisor firm
b 3.272 1.963 4.582 0.843 0.809 0.877 0.296 0.225 0.367
se 0.668 0.017 0.036
z 4.900 48.190 8.200
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Perceived trust of
advisor firm
b 1.185 −0.041 2.412 0.449 0.385 0.513
se 0.626 0.033
z 1.890 13.670
p 0.058 0.000
Satisfaction with
online tool
b 9.151 8.514 9.789
se 0.325
z 28.140
p 0.000
User expertise b −0.364 −0.901 0.172 0.222 0.181 0.263 0.135 0.105 0.165 0.072 0.031 0.113
se 0.274 0.021 0.015 0.021
z −1.330 10.600 8.840 3.470
p 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.001
Age b −0.009 −0.077 0.058 0.004 −0.001 0.009 −0.011 −0.015 −0.007 −0.005 −0.011 0.000 −0.017 −0.023 −0.010
se 0.035 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
z −0.270 1.430 −5.780 −2.080 −5.100
p 0.789 0.153 0.000 0.037 0.000
High education b 3.008 0.985 5.031 −0.094 −0.258 0.069 −0.170 −0.285 −0.054 −0.071 −0.225 0.083 0.026 −0.168 0.220
se 1.032 0.083 0.059 0.078 0.099
z 2.910 −1.130 −2.880 −0.900 0.260
p 0.004 0.260 0.004 0.367 0.793
Gender (Females
= 1)
b −1.290 −2.905 0.325 −0.002 −0.132 0.127 0.029 −0.062 0.120 −0.093 −0.214 0.028 −0.546 −0.697 −0.395
se 0.824 0.066 0.047 0.062 0.077
z −1.570 −0.040 0.620 −1.500 −7.090
p 0.118 0.971 0.536 0.134 0.000
Income (in
thousands of
euros)
b −0.016 −0.048 0.016 0.001 −0.002 0.003 −0.001 −0.003 0.000 0.001 −0.002 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.010
se 0.016 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
z −0.970 0.700 −1.430 0.600 4.480
p 0.334 0.481 0.153 0.551 0.000
Implicit Advice
(ImpAdvice)
b 2.932 −2.563 8.428 −0.019 −0.161 0.123
se 2.804 0.073
z 1.050 −0.260
p 0.296 0.794
ImpAdvice x
Perceived
expertise of
advisor
b −1.977 −3.726 −0.228
se 0.892
z −2.220
p 0.027
ImpAdvice x
Perceived trust
of advisor
b 1.459 −0.076 2.995
se 0.783
z 1.860
p 0.062
§ Error terms assumed to follow a normal distribution. Number of observations in advice acceptance equation (in remaining equations) is 1,508 (1,633). Estimates
for intercepts and error variances omitted for the sake of space (available upon request). “b” stands for point estimate, “se” for standard error, “z” for standardized
effect, and “p” for p-value.
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perceived trust (β = 0.843; p b .001). Since our scenario
estimates are average effects in respect to a common baseline
(a not-for-profit advice-only firm, i.e., a government-sponsored comparison website) and the measurement scales
are the same for trust and expertise (from 1 to 7), we can have
a sense of the relative impact of firm type on trust and
expertise. Our results show that being a for-profit advisor firm
Fig. 4. Evaluation scores for perceived expertise and trust by type of advisor firm.
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pension product provider (vs. an advice-only firm) in the
formation of trust (|−0.491 | N |−0.378 |), but not in the
formation of perceptions of expertise (|−0.224 | b 0.566).
In other words, firms that have a for-profit structure
clearly face a much greater challenge in convincing
consumers to trust them than not-for-profit firms do, so
they will need to find other aspects in their strategy to
compensate for this disadvantage. Fig. 4 graphically illus-
trates the differences in perceived levels of expertise and trust
between the four separate firms representing the four
different firm types (note that the graph is based directly on
evaluation scores observed in our survey, not on estimates of
the model parameters).9 Dropping the “implicit advice” interactions from the model leads to the
same results, but the effect of perception of trust becomes more pronounced
(β = 1.987; p b .001).
10 Standardized coefﬁcients indicate relative predictive strength insofar as the
independent variables have similar distributions. A McNemar test for paired
binomial data did not reject the distributional equality of the two variables
(p N .10).Mediators of the Effect of Firm Type on Advice Acceptance
Turning to our focal dependent variable, our results
clearly indicate that consumer perceptions of both expertise
and trust are significant and positive predictors of acceptance
of online pension advice, with higher levels of both
perceptions being associated with a higher likelihood of
acceptance of a firm's (explicit or implicit) recommendation
(β = 3.272; p b .001 and β = 1.185; p b .10 for expertise andtrust, respectively).9 Judging by their standardized coeffi-
cients, the importance of expertise in driving the acceptance
of online pension advice is higher than that of trust (4.900
and 1.890 for expertise and trust, respectively).10 The
likelihood of acceptance of online pension advice is not
affected directly by the type of firm (β = 0.112; p N .10 and
β = 0.148; p N .10, for profit orientation and role in the sales
channel, respectively), but it is indirectly through the full
mediating effect of both perceived expertise and trust, as a
firm's profit orientation and role in the sales channel do affect
both perceptions (as discussed previously).
For the same reason, satisfaction with the online tool, which,
in line with the literature on decision support systems (e.g., Li
and Gregor 2011; Liang, Lai, and Ku 2006), is a strong and
significant positive predictor of advice acceptance (β = 9.151;
p b .001), also mediates the effect of firm type on advice
acceptance, as a firm's profit orientation and role in the sales
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significant impact on satisfaction (see the previous discussion
of results). Because of that and the significant impact of
satisfaction on advice acceptance, our results also indicate that
firm type (“who delivers the advice”) has an effect on the
satisfaction with the online interactive decision tool that is
partially mediated by perceptions of expertise and perceptions
of trust (“partially” because firm types do have a direct effect
on satisfaction; see again the previous discussion of results).
The total indirect effect of a for-profit firm type on advice
acceptance (through the mediators “expertise” and “trust” and
from those through the mediator “satisfaction”) is negative and
significant (βindirect = −2.472 se = 1.015, p b .05; 95% CI =
−4.462 to −0.483), while the total indirect effect of a pension
product provider firm type (through the same paths) is positive
and significant (βindirect = 2.235 se = 0.928, p b .05; 95%
CI = 0.416 to 4.055).11
The partial mediation helps explain the strong effect of
satisfaction on advice acceptance (note again that our scenario
estimates are average effects with respect to a common baseline
and, like trust and expertise, satisfaction is measured on a scale
from 1 to 7): firm type also directly affects satisfaction with the
online tool. Assuming all other drivers to be constant, an
increase in satisfaction by one unit (from say the current
average, 4.67, to 5.67) increases the likelihood of online
pension advice acceptance by roughly 9.2 percentage points
(recall that advice acceptance likelihood ranges from 0% to
100%). Not surprisingly then, online pension advisors should
ensure that consumers in general (who are increasingly
heterogeneous), and senior consumers in particular (who are
closer to retirement) are satisfied with their interactions with
automated tools available online.12 However, as our results on
the impact of consumer characteristics suggest, this may be
easier said than done.11 Note that both the total indirect effect of for-proﬁt and that of pension
product provider on advice acceptance are the sum of seven products of
coefﬁcient estimates, corresponding to all the paths in between (see Figure
2): via expertise (−0.224*3.272 = −0.733 se = 0.262 and
0.566*3.272 = 1.853 se = 0.477), via trust (−0.491*1.185 = −0.582 se =
0.410 and −0.378*1.185 = −0.448 se = 0.315), via satisfaction
(0.270*9.151 = 2.469 se = 0.580 and −0.183*9.151 = −1.678 se = 0.541),
via expertise to trust (−0.224*0.843*1.185 = −0.224 se = 0.171 and
0.566*0.843*1.185 = 0.566 se = 0.400), via expertise to satisfaction
(−0.224*0.296*9.151 = −0.607 se = 0.197 and 0.566*0.296*9.151 = 1.534
se = 0.320), via trust to satisfaction (−0.491*0.449*9.151 = −2.019 se =
0.281 and − 0.378*0.449*9.151 = −1.553 se = 0.247), via expertise to
trust to satisfaction (−0.224*0.843*0.449*9.151 = −0.776 se = 0.226 and
0.566*0.843*0.449*9.151 = 1.961 se = 0.307). The standard errors used in
the statistical tests above are bootstrapped (see Preacher and Hayes 2008;
Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010).
12 As we have discussed in our literature review and conceptualization section,
the online interaction process is a very elaborate one as it depends on several
aspects within three different domains: the consumer, the communication, and
the information system. Hence, successful online pension advisors probably
need to perform well on all or at least most of these aspects to do well on
satisfaction (which we implicitly assumed to be a proper summary measure of
all three interaction-domains).The Impact of Consumer Characteristics and the Moderating
Effect of Implicit Advice
Age is estimated to negatively and significantly affect
satisfaction with the consumer–online tool interaction (β =
−0.005; p b .05), which means that, on average, and all else
equal, older consumers are less satisfied using automated
tools to generate pension advice than younger ones. The fact
that user expertise is positively and significantly related to
interaction satisfaction (β = 0.072; p b .001), as it is to
perceptions of firm expertise (β = 0.222; p b .001) and trust
(β = 0.135; p b .001), and older consumers have signifi-
cantly less user expertise than the young on average (β =
−0.017; p b .001), makes the segment of senior consumers
even more challenging for financial advisors operating online
—the kind of challenge they face with female consumers too,
who also perceive themselves as having significantly lower
user expertise than males (β = −0.546; p b .001). As
expected, older consumers also perceive firms as less
trustworthy than younger consumers do (β = −0.011;
p b .001), which makes them a particularly sensitive group
for the “least-trusted” for-profits and product providers (as
opposed to the “most-trusted” not-for-profits and advisors-
only).
All in all, compared to the effects of perceived firm
expertise, trust in the firm, and interaction satisfaction, the
impact of consumer demographics is limited, and is
essentially linked to self-perceived user expertise. In fact,
we only found a significant effect of higher education on
online advice acceptance (β = 3.008; p b .01), indicating
that those with a bachelor degree or higher are more inclined
to accept the online advice than consumers with lower
education. At the same time, highly educated consumers
trust an online pension advisor significantly less than the
less educated (β = −0.170; p b .01). All other effects of
consumer demographics are insignificant.
Interestingly, generating a firm's implicit advice signifi-
cantly weakens the positive effect of perceptions consumers
hold about a financial firm's expertise (β = −1.977; p b .01)
but strengthens the positive effect of perceptions consumers
hold about a financial firm's trust (β = 1.459; p b .10) on the
acceptance of pension advice. We interpret these effects on
the basis of the universal dimensions of competence and
warmth in social cognition (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner
2010; Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick 2007) that fit well the
expertise-trust characteristics we focus on. Specifically, the
competence dimension (i.e., expertise) on which advisors and
advice are judged is less important for those who have the
impression they have generated the advice themselves. The
warmth dimension (i.e., trust) of the advisor, on the other
hand, may even become more important, because those who
have the impression they have generated the advice
themselves are likely to maintain or even emphasize what
maximizes their best-interest—and thereby may highlight the
potential non-aligned principle-agent incentives and the role
trust plays.
119C.J.S. Lourenço et al. / Journal of Interactive Marketing 49 (2020) 107–124Discussion and Implications
The increasingly difficult challenge firms face today is how
to reassure consumers that online algorithms are unbiased—
and, in that sense, competent—and trustworthy. These two
dimensions are very important in the financial advice industry,
in particular when it comes to advising consumers about
pensions that involve high-stakes decisions that impact the
quality of living after retirement (the Dutch traditional standard
age of retirement is 65 while average life expectancy is more
than 15 years greater, 81.5). In this paper, we investigate how
the type of automated advisor firms—in particular, in terms of
profit orientation and role in the sales channel—may affect
acceptance of automated financial advice. In our study of
pension investments for retirement, we use an innovative online
automated tool, the Pension Builder (see Dellaert et al. 2016),
to generate the financial advice provided on behalf of an
insurance firm (a for-profit firm selling its own pension
products), a privately owned comparison website (a for-profit
firm providing only advice), a pension fund (a not-for-profit
firm selling its own pension products), or a Government-
sponsored comparison website (a not-for-profit firm providing
only advice). In so doing, we keep constant the effect of the
finance-based algorithm running on the Pension Builder
automated online interface (our interactive decision aid) and
look for the differences in advice acceptance accruing from the
different firms that typically communicate financial advice, and
whether those differences change depending on whether the
firm explicitly communicates the advice to the consumer or
does it only implicitly, giving the consumer the impression she
is his/her own advisor.
While controlling for the expected effect of consumers'
interaction satisfaction with an automated tool, we find that the
type of advisor firm—i.e., whose advisor consumers interact
with and get advice from—influences the acceptance of
financial advice. Importantly, we find that this effect is fully
mediated by how positively consumers perceive the advisor
firm in terms of expertise and trustworthiness.
As we propose, not-for-profit firms are likely to enjoy higher
levels of trust, and this is perhaps all the more evident in light of
and during financial crises that may hurt the perception of the
financial industry in general (Mayer 2013). Also, as we
predicted, comparison websites that do not sell their own
pension products are perceived to have relatively less expertise
—on top of that, and to make things worse, privately owned
websites are perceived untrustworthy. It may be that Dutch
consumers regard the regulatory requirements in the Nether-
lands as a strong enough buffer against the biased advice that
could result from selling products with high profit margins
(e.g., Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2010; Inderst and
Ottaviani 2012), which is more likely to be ensured among
government-sponsored websites.1313 The use of the terms “consumer” and “ﬁrm” may not do full justice to the
unique case of a pension fund and its plan members. Speciﬁcally, it is worth
noting that a fund plays a ﬁduciary role, i.e. it acts on behalf of its members, and
thereby both parties have a common goal.Moreover, consumers may trust that a computer-to-human
interaction, such as the one individuals have with the Pension
Builder, makes automated pension advisors use less discretion-
ary criteria than is customary in financial person-to-person
interactions, even if the advice is generated by for-profit firms
(see e.g., Cerqueiro, Degryse, and Ongena 2011 in the context
of discretionary rules that even banks follow). Automated
advisor algorithms are shown to not only outperform humans in
simple tasks (e.g., Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey 2015;
Grove et al. 2000), they are also seen as deserving no more
regulations than those upon “imperfect” human advisors (Ji
2017; Philippon 2016).
When it comes to perceptions of expertise, for-profit
firms, much like pension plan providers, are seen as having
higher levels of expertise than not-for-profit firms and
independent intermediaries. This suggests, as we anticipated
in our conceptualization, that without a high level of
expertise these firms would have a hard time surviving in a
highly sophisticated competitive market such as that for
pension products (see e.g., Coates and Glenn Hubbard
2007).
Besides the firm that supplies the advice, consumer
satisfaction with the online tool on which pension advice is
generated also has a strong positive effect on online advice
acceptance. This underscores the importance of designing
attractive and easy-to-use online interfaces for consumer
adoption of online advice. Finally, when we control for the
impact of individual characteristics on firm and interaction
evaluation, we find that online advice is more likely to be
accepted by consumers with a higher education.
Jointly, these findings demonstrate the importance of: (1)
building algorithm–human relationships that are based on trust
and expertise that are clearly perceived by human consumers;
(2) carefully designing online automated advice processes to
promote acceptance of automated advice; and (3) targeting
channels of online and offline advice to consumers who prefer
to receive advice on each type of channel, e.g., making sure that
algorithm-averse consumers have the opportunity to seek for
and receive offline advice.
As summarized in Fig. 4, automated advisors of pension
funds score high on both expertise and trust, while automated
advisors of privately owned comparison websites score low on
both perceptions. In turn, automated advisors of insurance firms
score high on expertise but low on trust, while the opposite
happen for automated advisors of government-sponsored
comparison websites. The online automated advice of a pension
fund (which has high scores on both expertise and trust), is thus
the one most likely to be accepted, followed by that of an
insurance firm (enjoying high scores on expertise yet low
scores on trust) and a government-sponsored comparison
website (enjoying high scores on trust yet low scores on
expertise). The online automated advice of a privately owned
comparison website (which has low scores on both expertise
and trust) is the least likely to be accepted.
We focused our research questions and empirical study on
expertise and trust in relation to firm type, and therefore can
only conjecture what firms in the financial industry can do to
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financial firms can incentivize users who trust them and who
regard them as experts to place their (positive) reviews online,
hoping that that user-generated content not only carries over to
other users but also enjoys a higher level of credibility (Nielsen
2015). This is what the Santander bank has done in its
“Prosperity” video campaign using “warm, engaging, funny,
and real” user-generated video footage to communicate its
commercial proposition “in a compelling and honest way,”
which is but one of many recent examples in the industry.14 In
line with the CMOs' expectations in the financial world,
research in marketing has shown not only that user-generated
content has an effect on sales (Dhar and Chang 2009) and stock
performance (Tirunillai and Tellis 2012) but also that the effect
of consumers' word-of-mouth in an online context is stronger
than that of traditional marketing (Trusov, Bucklin, and
Pauwels 2009). Betting on user-generated content and market-
ing activities in general that may boost perceptions of expertise
and trust may thus very well payoff, especially in interaction
with the types of firms that have an edge delivering automated
financial advice (in particular, pension funds).
Although we lack data on the profit margins faced by the
different types of firms offering online automated advice,
the 5.41 percentage points higher advice acceptance rate that
the online automated advice of a pension fund faces compared
to the same online automated advice coming from a privately
owned comparison website, may represent a commercial value
of as much as $38.5 per consumer seeking advice.15 This is an
appealing prospect for financial advisors having to deal with
slim profit margins (FT 2017).
Among the different consumer characteristics we control for,
higher education is the only one that impacts advice acceptance
directly and positively. The positive effect of higher education
is in line with the view that those financially literate process
financial information more easily (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011;
Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto 2010) and are thus more prone to
accept an advice, rather than the view that those with a lower
education recognize the need for advice (Lee and Moray 1992).
Interestingly, higher education and age negatively impact
both trust and (to a lesser extent) the satisfaction with the
interaction with the automated tool used to generate the advice
to be provided by the firm. Finally, compared to males, females
are on average clearly less satisfied with their interaction with
the advisor algorithm and interface and they perceive, though
less clearly, an online advisor firm as less trustworthy and as
less of an expert, on average. This suggests that advisor firms
going (or already) online will be particularly interested in
targeting young males without higher education.14 See https://www.moreaboutadvertising.com/2017/01/santander-tries-a-
dose-of-user-generated-prosperity/ and https://www.marketingweek.com/2017/
01/25/bank-brands-purposeful-approach/; both accessed 1 July 2019.
15 According to Deloitte (2017), the cost of a typical ﬁnancial planning session
with an (human) advisor is roughly $712 in the UK (at the current exchange
rate; see also https://www.unbiased.co.uk/cost-of-ﬁnancial-advice, cf. Deloitte
2017).Limitations and Future Research
The rise of automated advice-generating algorithms an-
nounced in the media, industry reports and in research editorials
across several disciplines has yet to generate an equally rich
stream of research findings, both empirical and theoretical. In
that respect, it would be of great value to test which conceptual
framework best fits this new phenomenon. One unifying
concept that may bind the three components of acceptance of
automated pension advice—firm, consumer, and their interac-
tions—is that of an implicit psychological reciprocity contract,
in which consumers contribute personal information and effort
in exchange for more useful advice by the firm (Rousseau
1989; Zeithaml 1988).
Like never before, increasing opportunities to express
preferences to firms and even create one's preferred products
help consumers build identities in the marketplace (Firat and
Dholakia 1998). At the same time the co-creation process may
take consumers closer to a worker mindset (Etgar 2008; Zwick,
Bonsu, and Darmody 2008), with the same mutuality and
reciprocity found in labor expectations (Dabos and Rousseau
2004). In economics, Akerlof (1982) introduced the term “gift-
exchange” to refer to the reciprocal relation between firms and
workers, and the “gift-exchange game” has been applied
successfully in the lab and in the field, showing, e.g., that
higher remunerations lead to increased effort (e.g., Maximiano,
Sloof, and Sonnemans 2007). Resting on an unwritten
psychological reciprocity contract, consumers working with
complex automated algorithms on websites of financial
advisors may also very well expect high(er) returns or lower
risks (see also footnote 4).
These “effort-accuracy” mechanisms are close to the
economics perspective that sees (advice for) consumption as
part of a consumer's production process (Becker 1965), where
the marginal effects of more input (information and/or effort)
depend on the (believed) production function. These concep-
tualizations would, in turn, easily link to the three stages of
Murthi and Sarkar (2003), namely learning and matching (the
third one, evaluation of advice, is more of a post-interaction
stage). An overarching challenge here, as in other behaviors of
consumers seeking financial advice, is the ensuing endogeneity
of the advice: it may not take long for automated algorithms to
learn consumer preferences based on the input or effort of
consumers, which in turn depends on the expected returns from
the advice.
Future research could also benefit from testing consumer
perceptions and acceptance of online advice in a real world
setting—where marketing activities take place on a daily basis
and user generated content plays an increasingly important role
—with, say, actual pension funds or insurance firms offering
pension products. It would be particularly interesting if advice
acceptance could be compared across different providers, to
investigate if the type of firm does indeed play an important
role in consumer online advice acceptance—even when a
consumer is already coupled with a certain type of firm. In
addition, it would be interesting to see the type of firm
consumers choose when they are given the freedom to choose
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advisors. Although we designed a controlled setting to ensure
that we could draw valid conclusions regarding the impact of
the type of firm providing advice on advice acceptance, we
only asked respondents to self-report advice acceptance.
This sequential process of advisor selection and advice
acceptance would be worthwhile modeling econometrically, to
establish the economic value of interaction design and firm
type. Similarly, it would be valuable studying the sequential
process that goes from the acceptance of online advice to the
actual steps consumers take in their pension strategies. For
example, will consumers more or instead less easily adopt
additional savings or investment strategies when given advice
online than when they are advised in person?
Finally, in future applications of online advice, it is
important to assess how consumers respond to advice that
combines multiple components of their retirement portfolio.
For example, depending on whether or not a consumer has
private savings or investments, the retirement investment
advice may shift. Thus, interactions may need to be more
extensive and may need dynamic updating from time to time to
capture possible changes in consumer circumstances. This may
offer further opportunities for increasing perceived firm
expertise and trust, but it may also lower consumer satisfaction
with the interaction process, all depending on how “all-in-one”
the online interactions are designed.
Appendix A.
A.1. Explicit [Implicit] Advice Survey Instructions Before
Investment Proﬁle Is Generated Online*
1. There are more and more online tools that [one of the
four firm types] can use to advise customers on [that people
can use when making] financial decisions. This research
focuses on a tool developed to advise people on the [to assist
you in coming to a] trade-off between risk and return when
investing their pension assets.
2. To be able to provide you with good advice on the trade-
off between risk and return in your pension investments, the
owner needs your age and income. [Your age and income play
a role in making the trade-off between risk and return in your
pension investments.]
3. To provide advice to people in making choices for
their retirement investments, the owner has created a new
retirement simulator. You will be asked to indicate [You can
use online tools while making your choice for your pension
investments. The owner has created a new retirement
simulator that you can use to help yourself make your choice.
In this pension simulator you can choose] when you want to
retire and how much risk you want to take with your pension
investments. A short instructional video now follows. You can
then use the simulator to experience the various options. The
owner will give you appropriate advice about your pension
investments based on your preferences. [In this way you can
try out various options and then decide for yourself which one
suits you best.]4. Now please click on the instructional video and view the
video completely.
5. We summarize the most important things in the owner's
pension simulator.
6. The pension simulator determines a hundred possible
outcomes based on the owner's calculation model that
accurately reflects the uncertainty about the future. What is
possible depends on the chosen [depends on your choice of
your] retirement date and the amount of risk that you want to
take, but of course also on developments on the stock market
and in the economy. Each block represents one of the possible
outcomes of the calculation model for these economic
developments.
In the simulator you can play with the age at which
[determine for yourself what age] you want to retire and how
much risk you want to accept for your pension investment. You
can use the sliders to set this. This way you can immediately see
the effect of retirement age and the amount of risk on your
expected gross pension income. Bear in mind that after your
retirement you will have more of your gross income than before
your pension. You therefore need less than 100% of your last-
earned gross wage as a pension.
7. If everything is clear, you can now start with the
simulator, in which you can indicate your preferences for the
[and use the simulator to determine your desired] retirement
age and the risk of your own pension investment. Otherwise
you can click here to watch the video again.
8. Ultimately, you must choose a specific investment profile
for your pension investments. Based on the institutions you
have chosen, the owner advises on [You have indicated your
ideal situation through the pension simulator. The pension
simulator also determines] which investment profile best
matches your preferences.
[at this point the respondent's investment profile is
generated online and shown on-screen].
* Translated from Dutch.
Declarations of Competing Interest
None.
Acknowledgment
The authors were funded by Netspar (Network for Studies
on Pensions, Aging and Retirement) in the Netherlands through
the large vision grant for projects on interactive pension
communication and decision making.
References
Aaker, J., K.D. Vohs, and C. Mogilner (2010), “Nonprofits Are Seen as Warm
and For-Profits as Competent: Firm Stereotypes Matter,” Journal of
Consumer Research, 37, 2, 224–37.
Akerlof, George A. (1982), “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97, 4, 543–69.
Alserda, G.A., B.G. Dellaert, L. Swinkels, and F.S. van der Lecq (2019),
“Individual Pension Risk Preference Elicitation and Collective Asset
Allocation with Heterogeneity,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 101,
206–25.
122 C.J.S. Lourenço et al. / Journal of Interactive Marketing 49 (2020) 107–124Arora, Neeraj, Xavier Dreze, Anindya Ghose, James D. Hess, Raghuram
Iyengar, Bing Jing, Joshi Yogesh, V. Kumar, Nicholas Lurie, Neslin Scotte,
S. Sajeesh, Su Meng, Niladri Syam, Jacqueline Thomas, and Z. John Zhang
(2008), “Putting One-to-One Marketing to Work: Personalization, Custom-
ization and Choice,” Marketing Letters, 19, 3–4, 305–21.
B&CE Financial Services Limited (2016), Public Attitudes to Financial Advice
. February.
Baker, Tom and Benedict G.C. Dellaert (2018), “Regulating Robo Advice
Across the Financial Services Industry,” Iowa Law Review, 103, 713–50.
Baron, Reuben M. and David A. Kenny (1986), “The Moderator-Mediator
Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual,
Strategic, and Statistical Considerations,” Journal of Personality & Social
Psychology, 51, 6, 1173–82.
Barrutia, J.M. and C. Echebarria (2005), “The Internet and Consumer Power:
The Case of Spanish Retail Banking,” Journal of Retailing and Consumer
Services, 12, 255–71.
Bechwati, Nada Nasr and Lan Xia (2003), “Do Computers Sweat? The Impact
of Perceived Effort of Online Decision Aids on Consumers' Satisfaction
with the Decision Process,” Journal of Consumer Psychology, 13, 1,
139–48.
Becker, Gary (1965), “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” Economic Journal,
75, 493–517.
Benbasat, Izak and Weiquan Wang (2005), “Trust in and Adoption of Online
Recommendation Agents,” Journal of the Association for Information
Systems, 6, 3, 4.
Bhattacharjee, Amit, Jason Dana, and Jonathan Baron (2017), “Anti-Profit
Beliefs: How People Neglect the Societal Benefits of Profit,” Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 113, 5, 671–96.
Bhattacharya, U., A. Hackethal, S. Kaesler, B. Loos, and S. Meyer (2012), “Is
Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a
Large Field Study,” Review of Financial Studies, 2–58.
Bodie, Z. and J. Treussard (2007), “Making Investment Choices as Simple as
Possible, But Not Simpler,” Financial Analysts Journal, 63, 3, 42–7.
Bonaccio, S. and R.S. Dalal (2006), “Advice Taking and Decision-Making: An
Integrative Literature Review, and Implications for the Organizational
Sciences,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101,
2, 127–51.
Briggs, P.A., A. De Angeli, and P. Lynch (2002), “Trust in Online Advice,”
Social Science Computer Review, 20, 3, 321–32.
Cadman, Brian, Mary Ellen Carter, and Stephen Hillegeist (2010), “The
Incentives of Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay,” Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 49, 3, 263–80.
Cerqueiro, Geraldo, Hans Degryse, and Steven Ongena (2011), “Rules Versus
Discretion in Loan Rate Setting,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20,
4, 503–29.
Coates, John C.I.V. and R. Glenn Hubbard (2007), “Competition in the Mutual
Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy,” The Journal of
Corporation Law, 33, 151.
Dabholkar, Pratibha A. and Richard P. Bagozzi (2002), “An Attitudinal Model
of Technology-Based Self-Service: Moderating Effects of Consumer Traits
and Situational Factors,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30,
3, 184–201.
Dabos, Guillermo E. and Denise M. Rousseau (2004), “Mutuality and
Reciprocity in the Psychological Contracts of Employees and Employers,”
Journal of Applied Psychology, 89, 1, 52–72.
Davis, Fred D. (1989), “Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Use, and User
Acceptance of Information Technology,” MIS Quarterly, 13, 3, 319–40.
———, Richard P. Bagozzi, and Paul R. Warshaw (1989), “User Acceptance
of Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical Models,”
Management Science, 35, 8, 982–1003.
Dellaert, Benedict G.C. and Pratibha A. Dabholkar (2009), “Increasing the
Attractiveness of Mass Customization: The Role of Complementary On-line
Services and Range of Options,” International Journal of Electronic
Commerce, 13, 3, 43–70.
Dellaert, B., B. Donkers, M. Turlings, T. Steenkamp, and E. Vermeulen (2016),
“Naar een nieuwe aanpak voor risicoprofielmeting voor deelnemers in
pensioenregelingen,” [in English: “Towards a New Approach to RiskProfile Measurement for Participants in Pension Schemes”], Netspar
Design Paper 49, . Netspar: Tilburg.
Deloitte (2017), “The Next Frontier: The Future of Automated Financial Advice
in the UK” (authors: Rahul Sharma, Joy Kershaw, Peter Evans, Simon
Ramos, Lou Kiesch, Rosalind Fergusson, Valeria Gallo), May. (from
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-
services/lu-future-automated-financial-advice-uk-15052017.pdf).
Dhar, Vasant and Elaine A. Chang (2009), “Does Chatter Matter? The Impact
of User-Generated Content on Music Sales,” Journal of Interactive
Marketing, 23, 4, 300–7.
Diehl, K., L.J. Kornish, and J.G. Lynch (2003), “Smart Agents: When Lower
Search Costs for Quality Information Increase Price Sensitivity,” Journal of
Consumer Research, 30, 1, 56–71.
Dietvorst, B.J., J.P. Simmons, and C. Massey (2015), “Algorithm Aversion:
People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms After Seeing them Err,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 1, 114–26.
Doney, P.M. and J.P. Cannon (1997), “An Examination of The Nature of Trust
in Buyer–Seller Relationships,” Journal of Marketing, 61, 2, 35–52.
Donkers, B., C. Lourenço, and B. Dellaert (2012), “Measuring and Debiasing
Consumer Pension Risk Attitudes,” Netspar Panel Paper 28, Netspar:
Tilburg.
———,———, D. Goldstein, and B. Dellaert (2013), “Building a Distribution
Builder: Design Considerations for Financial Investment and Pension
Decisions,” Netspar Design Paper 20, Tilburg: Netspar.
Elrod, T., J.J. Louviere, and K.S. Davey (1992), “An Empirical Comparison of
Ratings-Based and Choice-Based Conjoint Models,” Journal of Marketing
Research, 29, 3, 368.
Esmaeilzadeh, P., M. Sambasivan, N. Kumar, and H. Nezakati (2015),
“Adoption of Clinical Decision Support Systems in a Developing
Country: Antecedents and Outcomes of Physician's Threat to Perceived
Professional Autonomy,” International Journal of Medical Informatics,
84, 8, 548–60.
Etgar, M. (2008), “A Descriptive Model of the Consumer Co-Production
Process,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 36, 97–108.
Fagerlin, Angela, Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher, and Peter A. Ubel (2011), “Helping
Patients Decide: Ten Steps to Better Risk Communication,” Journal of the
National Cancer Institute, 103, 19, 1436–43.
Firat, A.F. and N. Dholakia (1998), Consuming People: From Political
Economy to Theaters of Consumption. London: Routledge.
Fiske, Susan T., Amy J.C. Cuddy, and Peter Glick (2007), “Universal
Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence,” Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 11, 2, 77–83.
Fornero, E., M.C. Rossi, and C.U. Brancati (2014), “Explaining Why, Right or
Wrong, (Italian) Households Do Not Like Reverse Mortgages,” Journal of
Pension Economics and Finance, 1–23.
FT (2015), “Algorithms Step into Pensions ‘Advice Gap’,” November 24, 2015
(from https://www.ft.com/content/511e7840-78af-11e5-a95a-
27d368e1ddf7).
FT (2017), “Profit Margins Squeezed at Global Wealth Managers,” June 13,
2017 (from https://www.ft.com/content/07339a4c-5032-11e7-bfb8-
997009366969).
Goldstein, D.G., E.J. Johnson, and W.F. Sharpe (2008), “Choosing Outcomes
Versus Choosing Products: Consumer-Focused Retirement Investment
Advice,” Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 3, 440–56.
Goodwin, P., M. Gönül, and D. Önkal (2013), “Antecedents and Effects of
Trust in Forecasting Advice,” International Journal of Forecasting, 29, 2,
354–66.
Grove, William M., David H. Zald, Boyd S. Lebow, Beth E. Snitz, and Chad
Nelson (2000), “Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis,”
Psychological Assessment, 12, 1, 19–30.
Harvey, Nigel and Ilan Fischer (1997), “Taking advice: Accepting help,
improving judgment, and sharing responsibility,” Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 70, 2, 117–33.
Häubl, G. and V. Trifts (2000), “Consumer Decision Making in Online
Shopping Environments: The Effects of Interactive Decision Aids,”
Marketing Science, 19, 1, 4–21.
Iacobucci, D. (2008), Mediation Analysis (No. 156). Sage.
123C.J.S. Lourenço et al. / Journal of Interactive Marketing 49 (2020) 107–124Inderst, Roman and Marco Ottaviani (2012), “How (Not) To Pay For Advice: A
Framework For Consumer Financial Protection,” Journal of Financial
Economics, 105, 2, 393–411.
Inthorn, J., M.E. Tabacchi, and R. Seising (2015), “Having the Final Say:
Machine Support of Ethical Decisions of Doctors,” in Machine Medical
Ethics. S.P.V. Rysewyk, M. Pontier, editors. Berlin, Germany: Springer,
181–206.Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-
319-08108-3_12.
Ji, Megan (2017), “Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisors
Under The Investment Advisers Act of 1940,” Columbia Law Review, 117,
6, 1543–83.
Jung, Dominik, Verena Dorner, Florian Glaser, and Stefan Morana (2018),
“Robo-Advisory: Digitalization and Automation of Financial Advisory,”
Business and Information Systems Engineering, 1–6.
Kline, R.B. (2011), Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling
3rd ed. New York: Guilford Press.
Lee, John and Neville Moray (1992), “Trust, Control Strategies and
Allocation of Function in Human-Machine Systems,” Ergonomics, 35,
10, 1243–70.
Li, Manning and Shirley Gregor (2011), “Outcomes of Effective Explanations:
Empowering Citizens Through Online Advice,” Decision Support Systems,
52, 1, 119–32.
Liang, T.-P., H.-J. Lai, and Y.-C. Ku (2006), “Personalized Content
Recommendation and User Satisfaction: Theoretical Synthesis and Empir-
ical Findings,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 23, 3, 45–70.
Lundeberg, Mary A., Paul W. Fox, and Judith Punćcohaŕ (1994), “Highly
Confident But Wrong: Gender Differences and Similarities in Confidence
Judgments,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 86, 1, 114.
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia S. Mitchell (2011), “Financial Literacy Around
the World: An Overview,” Journal of Pension Economics & Finance, 10, 4,
497–508.
———, ———, and Vilsa Curto (2010), “Financial Literacy Among the
Young,” Journal of Consumer Affairs, 44, 2, 358–80.
Maximiano, Sandra, Randolph Sloof, and Joep Sonnemans (2007), “Gift
Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm,” Economic Journal, 117, 1025–50.
Mayer, Colin (2013), Firm Commitment: Why the Corporation Is Failing Us
and How to Restore Trust in It. Oxford: OUP.
Merton, Robert C. (2006), “Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans,”
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 18, 1, 15–24.
Murthi, B.P.S. and Sumit Sarkar (2003), “The Role of the Management
Sciences in Research on Personalization,” Management Science, 49,
October, 1344–62.
Nielsen (2015), “Recommendations from Friends Remain Most Credible Form
of Advertising Among Consumers; Branded Websites Are the Second-
Highest-Rated Form,” https://www.nielsen.com/eu/en/press-releases/2015/
recommendations-from-friends-remain-most-credible-form-of-advertising/,
Accessed date: 1 July 2019.
Nyce, S., S.J. Schieber, J.B. Shoven, S.N. Slavov, and D.A. Wise (2013), “Does
Retiree Health Insurance Encourage Early Retirement?” Journal of Public
Economics, 104, 40–51.
Philippon, Thomas (2016), The Fintech Opportunity. No. w22476 . National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Prahl, A. and L. Van Swol (2017), “Understanding Algorithm Aversion: When
Is Advice from Automation Discounted?” Journal of Forecasting, 36,
691–702.
Preacher, K.J. and A.F. Hayes (2008), “Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies
for Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator
Models,” Behavior Research Methods, 40, 3, 879–91.
Prince, M. (1993), “Women, Men, and Money Styles,” Journal of Economic
Psychology, 14, 3, 175–82.
Qiu, Lingyun and Izak Benbasat (2009), “Evaluating Anthropomorphic Product
Recommendation Agents: A Social Relationship Perspective to Designing
Information Systems,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 25, 4,
145–82.
Ramsey, R.P. and R.S. Sohi (1997), “Listening to Your Customers: The Impact
of Perceived Salesperson Listening Behavior on Relationship Outcomes,”
Academy of Marketing Science, 25, 2, 127–37.Ricci, Francesco and Hannes Werthner (2006), “Introduction to the Special
Issue: Recommender Systems,” International Journal of Electronic
Commerce, 11, 2, 5–7.
Rogers, Everett M. (2003), Diffusion of Innovations 5th ed. New York: The
Free Press.
Rousseau, Denise M. (1989), “Psychological and Implied Contracts in
Organizations,” Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2, 2,
121–39.
Schrah, Gunnar E., Reeshad S. Dalal, and Janet A. Sniezek (2006), “No
Decision‐Maker is an Island: Integrating Expert Advice with Information
Acquisition,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 1, 43–60.
Senecal, S. and J. Nantel (2004), “The Influence of Online Product
Recommendations on Consumers' Online Choices,” Journal of Retailing,
80, 2, 159–69.
Shapiro, S.P. (1987), “The Social Control of Impersonal Trust,” American
Journal of Sociology, 93, 3, 623–58.
Singh, J. and D. Sirdeshmukh (2000), “Agency and Trust Mechanisms in
Consumer Satisfaction and Loyalty Judgments,” Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science, 28, 1, 150–67.
Sniezek, J.A., G.E. Schrah, and R.S. Dalal (2004), “Improving Judgement with
Prepaid Expert Advice,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 17, 3,
173–90.
——— and L. Van Swol (2001), “Trust, Confidence, and Expertise in a Judge-
Advisor System,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 84, 2, 288–307.
Su, H., L.B. Comer, and S. Lee (2008), “The Effect of Expertise on Consumers'
Satisfaction with the Use of Interactive Recommendation Agents,”
Psychology & Marketing, 25, 859–80, https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.20244.
Sundaresan, S. and F. Zapatero (1997), “Valuation, Optimal Asset Allocation
and Retirement Incentives of Pension Plans,” Review of Financial Studies,
10, 3, 631–60.
Time (2017), “Everything You Need to Know About Using and Choosing a
Robo-Advisor,” January 18, 2017 (from http://time.com/money/4616753/
robo-advisor-online-financial-planning-advice/).
Tirunillai, Seshadri and Gerard J. Tellis (2012), “Does Chatter Really Matter?
Dynamics of User-Generated Content and Stock Performance,” Marketing
Science, 31, 2, 198–215.
Trusov, Michael, Randolph E. Bucklin, and Koen Pauwels (2009), “Effects of
Word-of-Mouth Versus Traditional Marketing: Findings from an Internet
Social Networking Site,” Journal of Marketing, 73, 5, 90–102.
Tseng, S. and B.J. Fogg (1999), “Credibility and Computing Technology,”
Communications of the ACM, 42, 5, 39–44.
Urban, G.L. and J.R. Hauser (2004), ““Listening In” to Find and Explore New
Combinations of Customer Needs,” Journal of Marketing, 68, 2, 72–87.
Van der Heijden, Hans (2003), “Factors Influencing the Usage of Websites: The
Case of a Generic Portal in The Netherlands,” Information and
Management, 40, 6, 541–9.
Van Schie, R., B.G.C. Dellaert, and B. Donkers (2015), “Promoting Later
Planned Retirement: Construal Level Intervention Impact Reverses with
Age,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 50, 124–31.
Van Swol, L.M. (2009), “The Effects of Confidence and Advisor Motives on
Advice Utilization,” Communication Research, 36, 6, 857–73.
——— and J.A. Sniezek (2005), “Factors Affecting the Acceptance of Expert
Advice,” British Journal of Social Psychology, 44, 443–61.
Varadarajan, R. and M. Yadav (2002), “Marketing Strategy and the Internet: An
Organizing Framework,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30,
4, 296–312.
Vogel, E., A. Ludwig, and A. Börsch-Supan (2015), “Aging and Pension
Reform: Extending the Retirement Age and Human Capital Formation,”
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, June 2015, 1–27.
Vuuren, D. (2014), “Flexible Retirement,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 28, 3,
573–93.
Waern, Y. and R. Ramberg (1996), “People's Perceptions of Human and
Computer Advice,” Computers in Human Behavior, 12, 1, 17–27.
White, T.B. (2005), “Consumer Trust and Advice Acceptance: The Moderating
Role of Benevolence, Expertise and Negative Emotions,” Journal of
Consumer Psychology, 2, 15, 141–8.
124 C.J.S. Lourenço et al. / Journal of Interactive Marketing 49 (2020) 107–124Wind, J. and V. Mahajan (2001), “The Challenge of Digital Marketing,” in
Digital Marketing: Global Strategies from the World's Leading
Experts. J. Wind, V. Mahajan, editors. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 3–25.
WSJ (2015), “The Best Online Tools for Retirement Planning and Living,”
January 19, 2015 (from https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-best-online-tools-
for-retirement-planning-and-living-1421726470).
Xiao, Bo and I. Benbasat (2007), “Consumer Decision Support Systems for E-
Commerce: Design and Adoption of Product Recommendation Agents,”
Management Information Systems Quarterly, 31, 1, 317–29.
Yaniv, Ilan (2004), “Receiving Other People's Advice: Influence and Benefit,”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 93, 1, 1–13.——— and Eli Kleinberger (2000), “Advice Taking in Decision Making:
Egocentric Discounting and Reputation Formation,” Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83, 2, 260–81.
Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1988), “Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and
Value: A Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence,” Journal of
Marketing, 52, July, 2–22.
Zhao, X., J.G. Lynch Jr., and Q. Chen (2010), “Reconsidering Baron and
Kenny: Myths and Truths About Mediation Analysis,” Journal of
Consumer Research, 37, 2, 197–206.
Zwick, D., S.K. Bonsu, and A. Darmody (2008), “Putting Consumers to Work:
‘Co-Creation’ and New Marketing Govern-Mentality,” Journal of Con-
sumer Culture, 8, 2, 163–96.
